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Suicide attacks in the Muslim World
have intensified fears of Islam in the
West. Increasingly, Islam is narrowed
down to militant Islamism and under-
stood as being rooted in a fanatical
and violent tradition. Paradoxically,
these notions of self-martyrdom within
current Shia and Sunni discourse differ
markedly from traditional sources,1
and are, to a large extent, derived from
modern secular ideologies such as na-
tionalism and anti-imperialism. 
Suicide attacks in the Middle East
first emerged in the escalating con-
flicts of Lebanon and, later, Israel/Palestine. When Hizbullah carried
out its first suicide attack in 1982, Sunni authorities condemned this
act with reference to the prohibition of suicide in Islamic law, while
Shia ulama mostly refrained from commenting. Hizbullah militants
may have found some inspiration in Iran where the concept of martyr-
dom was used to mobilize the masses for war against the Iraqi invasion
and overcome Iraqi minefields, however, the concrete example they
followed was reputedly that of Tamil resistance in Sri Lanka. Hizbullah
was not the only militia in Lebanon to adopt the method; secular mili-
tia aligned to the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) and the Com-
munist Party were involved in various suicide at-
tacks, including attacks carried out by women
and Christians.2 The attacks primarily targeted Is-
raeli troops and their local allies in Southern
Lebanon. The main reason why suicide attacks
became accepted within a short span of time was
their decisive “success,” the greatest “victory”
being the withdrawal of the US Marine Corps and
French military from Lebanon after having been
seriously hit by suicide bombers. It was only in
the mid-1990s that suicide attacks were adopted
by Palestinian organizations, in particular since
the second Intifada. Over the last few years suicide bombing has be-
come part of jihad—as defence of Muslim land and people—in Chech-
nya, Afghanistan, Saudi-Arabia, and most recently, Iraq. The attacks are
not undisputed in public opinion and religious discourse, and not all
bombers are perceived as martyrs. While the great majority condemns
the attacks of 9/11 and Madrid, as being contrary to Islamic principles,
“martyrdom operations” in the context of the struggle for national lib-
eration have found a growing acceptance.
Martyrs of Palestine
In Palestine those who died in the struggle against British troops
and Jewish militia, and later the Israeli army, have always been held in
high regard. They were remembered as shuhada—whether combat-
ants or civilians—regardless of their religious or political orientations.
In the early idiom of resistance the status as victim shaped the self-
image of Palestinians to a great extent. From the early 1960s onward
secular nationalist organizations such as Fatah and PFLP undertook to
overcome this passive image and to transform it into agency. In the
course of ongoing and ever more violent conflict, national slogans
and motifs mingled with religious ones—a process that is similarly
discernible in Israeli nationalism. Islamist organizations like Hamas
and Islamic Jihad revived the term mujahid that had been commonly
used in the 1930s and 1940s, at the expense of fida’i, “freedom fight-
er”. The word fida’i predates modern times and was not uncommon in
the early decades of Palestinian resistance, but it that had been made
fashionable by the secular groups such as Fatah. More recently, the
term istishhadi acquired currency for
those combatants who willingly mar-
tyr themselves in suicide operations.
The shift from a secular discourse of
resistance to a more religiously in-
spired discourse dates from the 1980s.
This shift in rhetoric reflects a more
general trend in the region in which
the ruling elites were increasingly dis-
credited because of corruption and
the apparent bankruptcy of their
“grand” secular projects, such as pan-
Arabism and socialism. Combined
with the growing criticism of Western
double standards in their policies towards the Middle East, secular
movements lost some of their earlier appeal but also assumed less ap-
parent secular stances. Religious argumentation gained increased
popularity in the political domain, a process that can be understood
as a withdrawal into the cultural “own” in contrast to the “other.” 
The first suicide bombing carried out by Hamas, occurred on
16 April 1993 when a car bomb exploded near the Jewish settlement
of Mehola on the West bank, leaving two persons killed including the
attacker.3 On 6 April 1994, retaliating the Goldstein massacre in He-
bron, eight persons were killed and 44 injured by a car bomb at a bus
station in Afula; a week later a Hamas militant blew himself up in the
Hadera central bus station, leaving five deaths and twenty injured.
The adoption of suicide attacks as a means of resistance was to a de-
gree the result of the deportation of hundreds of Hamas members in
1992 to Marj al-Zuhur in Southern Lebanon, where they intensified
contacts with Hizbullah which trained Hamas militants in the art of
suicide attacks in their camps in the Bekaa Valley. With the second In-
tifada suicide attacks became much more frequent; and albeit that the
Islamist organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad carried out most, more
secular groups, in particular the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades that are af-
filiated with the Fatah movement, and the Marxist-Leninist oriented
PFLP joined the mortal efforts. 
Today, those suicide attacks are considered as “martyrdom opera-
tions.” The legitimacy of these operations is not only acknowledged
by Muslim clergy, but also finds support among a number of Christian
Palestinian leaders, as well as among the Coptic clergy in Egypt. Attal-
la Hanna, former spokesman for the Orthodox Church in Jerusalem,
praised the “martyrdom operations,” calling on Arab Christians to join
hands in carrying out martyr operations.4
The broad support for suicide attacks against Israeli targets reflects
the desperate state of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. In
the 1990s the number of Israeli settlements on the West bank dou-
bled. Further land grab took place by designing security zones, of late-
ly including the so-called security-wall. Over the last three years the
death toll among Palestinians due to Israeli attacks amounted to 3000,
with over 40,000 injured and a larger number losing their homes and
livelihood in collective punishments. Recurrent closures hamper trav-
el and gravely limit public space. Ongoing repression caused and
maintains a dramatic worsening of the local economy, figuring soar-
ing unemployment rates. Given that diplomatic endeavours failed to
deliver totally, radical options to reverse the desperate situation gain
credibility. 
Martyrdom
Suicide attacks referred to as “martyrdom-
operations” by their executors and
sympathizers, have become a weapon of
mainly Islamist groups in the Middle East.
The first suicide attacks in the early 1980s
in Lebanon met with criticism, in particular
among the Sunni religious establishment.
Though they were then regarded as violations
of Islamic principles, today suicide attacks
receive broader popular support and religious
backing—and are understood—within the
context of legitimate resistance and national
struggle for liberation.
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An alternate portrait
In his reconstruction of the life of the Prophet, it remains unclear if
Rusafi was aware of another “secular” reading of the same period of Is-
lamic history, which had been proposed a few years earlier. The resem-
blance between the two contemporary endeavours is striking. Ali Abd
al-Raziq (1888–1966) had published his most controversial essay Islam
and the Foundations of Political Power in 1925. He also had ventured be-
yond the traditional narratives of the early phases of the Muslim com-
munity in order to find answers to modern questions. His quest, fol-
lowing immediately the abrogation of the Ottoman caliphate by
Mustafa Kamal Atatürk in 1924, was to question the prevalent thesis
that Islam encompasses both religion and politics. His conclusions,
which seem to contradict Rusafi’s, are also strikingly original. Abd al-
Raziq found that the community created and led by the Prophet in
Medina was by no means a state, in the modern sense. Although it
shared some external features with those of a polity (collecting taxes,
building an “army,” administrating justice, appointing “ambassadors”
to neighbouring states), it was by all means just a religious community,
intended to create a space where individuals could follow their new re-
ligious beliefs and practices at a distance from the hostility of their trib-
al leaders, who had remained hostile to the new religion. The Prophet
did not attempt, nor promote, anything beyond this kind of communi-
ty. The absence of political concerns could be indicated by the fact that
he did not appoint any successor or provide rules for the continuity of
his community, as any political leader with a political agenda would
have done. It was Muslims who, after the death of the Prophet, decid-
ed to transform this religious community into a polity, and who made
of it, in time, an empire. 
In order to defend his thesis, Abd al-Raziq also felt the need to pro-
pose a theory of prophecy. He did not question the idea of a message
literally delivered from God, as did Rusafi, but stressed its exceptional-
ity. He describes prophecy as a phenomenon which gives an elected
man total, comprehensive powers over his fellows. These powers in-
clude and exceed those of kings and temporal leaders. The “inclusion
of politics within the realm of religion” is thus an exceptional turn, a
break into the ordinary course of social and political history, whereby a
man endowed with a message and a mission, transforms the prevailing
order by providing new moral foundations. The exception is, by defin-
ition, not a lasting state and is not intended to outlive its founder.
Although having two different agendas, one rather “liberal” and the
other nationalist, both Abd al-Raziq and Maaruf Rusafi wrote at a time
where Muslim intellectuals were exposed to deep and rapid changes
and enjoyed an unprecedented opening in the intellectual sphere.
New explanations had to be sought and could—to some degree—be
proposed. They understood, and stressed, that the historical emer-
gence of Islam had deep and lasting political consequences, as it pro-
vided new models, aspirations, and values. Both also understood and
stressed that the understanding which prevailed in Muslim histories
did not depict the depth of such a revolution. The latter raised the ac-
counts of Muslim history, i. e. the building of new empires and sul-
tanates, to the status of an Islamic norm, and distorted the meaning of
the “political” message of the Prophet, i.e. that political systems had to
be grounded on shared beliefs and ethical principles, not that religion
had to provide, or did provide, the blue print for designing these polit-
ical systems.
However, Abd al-Raziq acted cautiously, perhaps too cautiously, by
not publishing anything following the controversy around his book.
Rusafi, on the other hand, entrusted his thoughts to an essay that
could not be published during his life-time, or even a few decades
later. The Elucidation of a Secret Enigma is likely to remain the work of a
poet who had not fully mastered scholarly methods and discipline, or
his impatience with the beliefs and attitudes of his fellow Muslims.
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Discourse on martyrdom
While some Palestinian scholars and scholars from other countries
condemned the suicide attacks with the argument, that suicide is pro-
hibited in Islam, others justified them as a legitimate part of the na-
tional struggle for liberation and a proper method of jihad. The Mufti of
Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin Abdullah al-Shaykh commented
in April 2001 that Islam forbids suicide attacks. His comments raised a
storm of criticism from supporters of the Palestinian resistance. Shaykh
al-Azhar, Muhammad Tantawi, the highest Islamic authority in Egypt
stated in the same year, that resistance in occupied Palestine is a duty
for Muslims and these suicide operations a legal means. In general, fat-
was frequently refer to Israeli violations of human rights and interna-
tional law and stress that Palestinians can neither come to their rights
by diplomatic means, nor by jihad with traditional means. Martyrdom
operations, so they argue, have nothing in common with suicide, be-
cause a person who commits suicide escapes life, whereas a Palestin-
ian martyr sacrifices his or her life carrying out a religious duty –the de-
fence of Muslim land and people—while employing the opportunities
of modern technology.5
A modern theology of martyrdom is as yet under construction. A
Hamas website attempts to supply proof to the argument that Pales-
tinian suicide attacks are no innovation but a continuation of Prophet-
ic traditions. Many fatwas and books have emerged, discussing ques-
tions including as to whether women who are carrying out martyr op-
erations are allowed to travel without a mahram, and whether they
may take off their headscarf if required so by their mission.6 Nationalist
arguments merge in theologies of martyrdom. Often terms “nation,”
“bravery,” and “heroism” are mentioned. The fact that Islamic rulings
forbid the killing of persons, who are not directly involved in war, is
often circumvented by the argument that the entire Israeli society is
militarised—with Israel’s system of universal conscription often given
as “proof”—and that martyrdom operations only return Israeli atroci-
ties.7
Political impotence and lack of prospect play a significant role in the
present cult of martyrs. Through their deeds they become individuals
capable of acting, even if only in the moment of death, which bestows
upon them and their families social prestige and financial rewards. The
weakness underlying these attacks is thus transformed into a personal
moment of strength.
Though there are ways to justify political violence in Islamic terms,
these are as such not part of a structural nature of “Islam.” The ideolog-
ical factors that promote the use of the concept of martyrdom for po-
litical ends cannot be detached from the rejection of basic rights, grave
social inequality, and the repression of non-violent means of opposi-
tion and resistance. Confrontational Western models and aggressive
politics reinforce constructs of foe images and bring about political
and social strategies that are increasingly subject to religious interpre-
tations. The further Islamization of the concept of suicide martyrdom is
essentially dependent on the political developments in these regions.
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